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DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM. By James S.
Fishkin.t New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1991.
Pp. viii, 133. $17.95.
Michael Fitts 2

Debate over political reform during the last two decades has
frequently pursued two different visions of governmental responsibility. On the one hand, many point to the dialogic role of governmental institutions, which in their ideal form can refine citizen goals
and preferences into something like a communal vision of "the public interest." Under this view, governmental processes and institutions, and the reform of those institutions, should be evaluated
according to the extent to which they further means-end rationality,
a reflective analysis of normative goals, and/or a convergence on a
communal vision. Civic republicanism, practical reasoning and
pragmatism are some of the scholarly literatures that have focused
on this value. 3 At the same time, another classic approach, perhaps
of an older legal vintage, has emphasized democratic accountability,
the faithfulness of decisionmaking to the wishes of "the people."
Institutions and their reform must come to terms, from this perspective, with (for democrats) the countermajoritarian difficulty or
(for law and economic types) principal-agency theory.
As is true with most other areas of scholarship, a synthetic
wave of writing specifically looks at institutions and reforms which
help reconcile major views, in this case attempting to forge what
Cass Sunstein has called a "deliberative democracy."4 Clearly, Sunstein, as well as Bruce Ackerman and others, have made insightful
contributions that fall into this tradition, as has James Fishkin in
his aptly titled new book, Democracy and Deliberation. Unlike
much of this latest scholarship, which tends to be theoretical and
court-centered, Fishkin's proposals are highly practical changes
aimed at improving the daily mechanics of the political process;
specifically, the functioning of the party nominating system. Simply
put, Fishkin proposes to create a national jury of randomly selected
party members who would meet and discuss issues at length with
1. Darrell K. Royal Regents Chair in Government, Law, and Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin and also chair of the Department of Government.
2. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
3. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L. J. 1539
(1988); Bruce Ackerman, We the People (Belknap Press, 1991); Michael Brint and William
Weaver, eds., Pragmatism in Law and Society (Westview Press, 1991) ("Pragmatism").
4. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 313 (1992).
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the candidates of their respective parties during the early primaries.
The result, Fishkin hopes, will be a deeper probing of proposed policies by the jury-whose votes on candidate preferences, to be reported in a separate poll, might preempt the daily opinion polls
which often capture only the unreflective impressions of the unfocused public during the hectic primary season.
There is much to commend this proposal. Fishkin focuses on a
serious problem-the rise of candidate-centered campaigns, the decline of reasoned debate during the nominating process, and the
sometimes tyrannical power exercised by the media during the primary season, when the public's impression of individual candidates
may be quite limited. While the purpose underlying this proposal is
merely to affect the dynamic of primary polls and the public debate
about them, it may improve the dynamic of the primary process
overall, which most observers, including many winners, agree have
serious drawbacks.s Fishkin also demonstrates a reluctance to call
for sweeping changes, presumably out of fear of the unknown-a
humility that the history of past primary reforms may well justify.
Despite these obvious advantages, one is left wondering
whether this type of approach should be expanded to other aspects
of governmental institutions. As I suggest below, I would be very
cautious about extending this model beyond Fishkin's quite limited
domain. While this incremental reform would be helpful, it should
not divert us from thinking and writing about more systemic
reforms.
First, some background. Over the past twenty years, both students and practitioners of politics have come to recognize several
drawbacks to the current primary political process. In the old days,
primary candidates were chosen largely by the party leadership,
with much less popular primary participation or significant public
primary debate. The theory behind this system,6 which now would
be put in terms of principal-agency theory, was that democracyboth in a participatory and a dialogic sense-best occurred between
the parties, not within them; in other words, party leaders were
most likely to be held accountable to the public by the threat of loss
at general election day, not by primary fights within the party.
Under this reasoning, the threat of an effective opposition in the
general election would force parties to focus and develop the most
important issues at the time when the general public was paying the
5. See Walter F. Mondale, Primaries Are No Test of Character, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,
1992, at A21.
6. This is aptly summarized originally in E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government
(Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942).
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most attention, participation was at its highest and the issues were
most clearly framed. Party structures thus allowed for an economy
of participation and dialogue. 1
This ideal of party responsibility, however, only has force to
the extent there are two strong, competitive and responsive party
structures and the issues coalesce along a clear right/left continuum.8 By 1968, with divisions in the Democratic Party over the
war in Vietnam and race, many rank and file members viewed party
leaders as unresponsive. The Democratic primary reforms after
1968, which substantially increased the importance of primaries,
opened the process to candidates selected outside the traditional
party establishment. With the increasing importance of the media
and public funding, as well as the decline of party identification in
the public, the nominating process has become a far more open one.
These changes have had several beneficial effects-the parties
are more receptive to certain types of new ideas and there is far
greater scrutiny of the primary political process than backroom
dealmaking allowed. The rigidities of the party bureaucracies have
also diminished in many respects. But there are several difficulties
with the current system, which should not be overstated but are
real.
First, making the parties directly responsive to the party primary electorate may have a tendency to advantage candidates who
are at the ideological wings. Since the median voter of each party is
likely to be more at either wing than the median voter of the general
electorate, and more ideological party members tend to vote in
primaries, the group selecting candidates in a primary is unlikely to
reflect the goals of the general electorate very well. While primary
voters may act strategically with an eye to the general election, they
are probably less likely to do so than party professionals.9 Thus, a
primary system may tend to push each party towards candidates at
its wing-the left of the Democratic Party, and the right of theRepublican Party.w
7. Related to this binary two-party concept of political accountability is a theory of
retrospective accountability in government. Since parties "captured" government, they could
be held retrospectively accountable for what had been done in government. This mode of
accountability was potentially superior to popular directives to the extent the public is considered better at evaluating the past consequences of government action, rather than directing its
leaders what to do. See generally Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in Amencan National Elections (Yale U. Press, 1981); V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate (Belknap
Press, 1966).
8. To the extent political preferences and visions are multi-peaked or stochastic, then
majority rule itself may have less meaning, except as a matter of agenda control.
9. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985).
10. See generally Nelson W. Polsby, Consequences of Party Reform (Oxford U. Press,
1983).
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Second, the free-wheeling discussion characteristic of primary
politics may lead to open fissures within the party that cannot be
repaired for the general election. Theorists of civic republicanism
and pragmatism envision public dialogue on the issues as leading
toward identification of common ground and respect for difference. 11 Whatever may be the case in other contexts, political parties, in order serve the functions described above at the general
election, must properly frame the issues to the public, maximize
participation and establish a system for managing debate and conflict. To achieve these goals, parties cannot allow all issues to be
placed on the public agenda, but instead must create institutions
that will manage the public dialogue. Two political parties-while
clearly excluding certain issues-have it in their institutional interest to surface issues that will capture a majority of the electorate
and minimize divisions that ultimately are unlikely to sway the
mass public. Multiple candidates, in contrast, may not have it in
their interest to focus public debate on major systemic issues that
will capture the mass electorate. Indeed, the existence of visible and
fractious party divisions may be one explanation for the weakness
since 1968 of the Democratic Party, whose open primary battles
appear to have contributed to its inability to win presidential elections in the fall.12
A third potential problem with the primary system is that it
may make election campaigns even more candidate-centered, that
is, focused on the individual personal qualities of candidates, rather
than the broad public issues. While the line between issues of candidate personality and public policy is murky, primaries with a large
number of candidates seeking to distinguish themselves from others
of similar political persuasion often focus on issues of personality.
Not only may little divide individual candidates ideologically from
other candidates, but the time needed to mount an effective issues
campaign which will affect the electorate is quite limited during a
primary. The result is that fewer of the finite political resources of
the party may be expended on creating the party political capital on
particular issues, and getting out the party message and vote in
November.l3
II. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10 (1987); Thomas C. Grey, What Good Is Legal Pragmatism? in
Brint and Weaver, eds., Pragmatism at 9 (cited in note 3); Sunstein, 97 Yale L. J. 1534 (cited
in note 3).
12. See Martin Wattenberg, The Republican Presidential Advantage In The Age Of
Party Disunity, in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernel, eds., The Politics of Divided Government
(Westview Press, 1991).
13. This problem should not be overstated. In many cases the public, at least in the
general election, may be able to sift through the symbolism and rhetoric of the campaigns to

198

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:194

Finally, and implicit in all of the above, primaries can diminish
the organizational power of political parties, which can be valuable
in stimulating political participation and election turnout within the
society, getting things done in government once the primary season
is over, and generally holding politicians as a group politically accountable for government action or inaction in a world of multiple
actors and unclear collective responsibility. Given the changes in
the primary system, and the effect of other political and social
changes on the decline of parties more generally,t4 politicians understand that the party leaders and organizational apparatus will be
less important in choosing candidates. The media, PAC's and consultants are far more significant than in the past in helping to win
nominations. The result may be a political system where individual
representatives in government are less beholden to the leadership
when legislation is needed or decisions need to be made or
implemented.• s
Of course, many of these problems can be and are overcome.
Leaders can and do discuss the issues; the public votes; middle of
the road political leaders get nominated and win elections; and parties do have inftuence.t6 Yet despite its other advantages, the primary system can create a burden, a cost of political organization,
which may increase some of the political problems and costs of
political mediation, organization and decisionmaking.
Some of these concerns, especially the rise of candidate-centered primaries, animate the proposals outlined in Democracy and
Deliberation. Criticizing our current focus on sound bites, daily
polling data and early primaries, Fishkin calls for the creation of a
national party jury randomly selected from the party electorate at
the beginning of each primary season. This jury would meet with
the candidates early on for an extended period to discuss the issues,
and ultimately vote on their favorite. Ideally, the results would be
widely reported in the public press, overshadowing the daily and
often distorted polling data which has become so prominent in selecting candidates. If politically significant, such jury polls might
the substance of underlying policies. See, e.g., Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voter (U. of
Chi. Press, 1991).
14. See Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic
Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567 (1988).
15. The opening up of the party may also have diminished the repeat-player qualities of
political relationships when there was a hierarchically organized party structure. As a result,
some might argue, there could be more of a potential for suboptimal strategic behavior. See
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, 1984).
16. See D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation (U.
of Chi. Press, 1991); Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, Parties and Committees in the U.S.
House of Representatives (1989) (unpublished manuscript).
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force the candidates to think about and come to terms with major
issues, which may count for more in an extended give and take.
There is much to be said in favor of this change. Fishkin focuses on important issues and their possible alleviation through
modest, but (as a result) politically realistic reforms. The fundamental assumption of Fishkin's approach is that our current political institutions suffer from insufficient debate about public issues.
The face-to-face sustained discussion of the jury would allow a
deeper analysis, and hence perhaps a greater likelihood of the selection of candidates who would better deal with public problems.
While legal scholars such as Frank Michelman and Owen Piss seem
to locate the greatest source of civic republican virtue in the
courts, 11 these institutions obviously lack sustained democratic legitimacy. Others have pointed to the Congress, or the federal bureaucracy, as other institutional facilitators of dialogue.1s Fishkin
would create a new institution-a national jury, which has the size
advantages of the courts yet arguably greater democratic legitimacy, at least in the eyes of social scientists steeped in the theoretical beauty of random samples. More important, this new creature
would be incorporated into a part of the political process that is
characterized by very little systemic dialogue-the political primaries. While a quite modest change, this may help.
Of course, the mechanics of the proposal may need to be
worked out. For one, there is no good opportunity for experts to
participate actively in the jury process. Candidate comments on the
budget, for example, may be quite meaningless without the opportunity for, or fear of, extended scrutiny by experts in the field. Similarly, interest groups may want their input into the process. While
there is much negative that comes from organized interest group
influence, individuals clearly have much to gain from their knowledge of and participation in the activities of such groups. As the
civic republicans have argued, "[i]nterest groups may be essential
[to] civic republicanism ... , because they consolidate people with
common private interests and backgrounds, ... streamline the input
that the government receives, . . . and provide feedback to group
members about how the government's ultimate decision addresses
their particular concerns." 19
17. See Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term- Traces of Self-Government,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986); Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms
of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. I (1979).
18. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification For the Bureaucratic State,
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985).
19. Seidenfeld, 105 Harv. L. Rev. at 1530-31 (cited in note 18). Indeed, absent that
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While these concerns are admittedly minor, especially given
the limited use of the poll, there is still something disquieting to a
democrat such as myself about this approach, and the direction in
thinking it might reflect about political reform if it were to be generalized.20 On paper, it is ingenious. If the public is incapable of sustaining a meaningful dialogue on the issues, then perhaps a
randomly selected jury of political peers will. The randomness of
the selection process will give it some political legitimacy, and its
size and length of operation will provide the opportunity for the
intellectual depth lacking in mass political institutions.
Unfortunately, Fishkin's solution to the primary problem-to
create meaningful participation for only a representative samplecould run the risk of exacerbating the systemic problem of declining
public participation, both practically as well as symbolically.21 In a
post-industrial state, healthy political institutions ultimately need to
facilitate mass participation and dialogue. Yet Fishkin's approach,
if generalized, would not only avoid assimilation of the mass public,
but might further diminish the influence of the traditional party
structure. To the extent private juries are viewed as crucial in the
selection of candidates, the importance of the party organization
could be further reduced. This may be important not only on election day, when the organization may not be there to help get out the
vote, but also in the running of government, when the relationships
forged between the party elite are useful in getting a president's program adopted in Congress and implemented in the bureaucracy and
the states. Simply put, candidates selected by jury meetings with
the public may well be less responsive to party structure.
Beyond its affect on overall participation, it is also unclear how
much this proposal will ultimately further the selection of institupublic accountability, it is unclear to what extent the public will pay attention to the poll; like
the public polling, it runs the risk of being dismissed as a result of the presence or slickness of
particular candidates. To the extent this is true, dialogue over public issues in a small group
setting may have its own limitations, which I am sure Fishkin would be the first to recognize.
20. As suggested above, Democracy and Deliberation is very much a part of the newest
tradition of scholars attempting to synthesize democratic and dialogic principles in the construction of political institutions. Acknowledging that the current primary system does not
create a meaningful public dialogue over the issues, Fishkin then turns to a different form of
representative dialogue-a candidate debate judged by a randomly selected political jury.
21. The proposal is intended to confront, but does not solve directly, the problem of the
massive decline in political participation. While the primaries were originally created to increase political participation in the United States, the evidence is that they have had the
opposite effect. Political participation is at the lowest levels in history in the United States,
probably skewing the background of the electorate that ultimately makes the decisions and
perhaps diminishing the quality of the focus of those who do participate. See Walter Dean
Burnham, Shifting Patterns of Congressional Voting Panicipation in Walter Dean Burnham,
The Cu"ent Crisis in American Politics (Oxford U. Press, 1982); Sam Peltzman, Voten As
Fiscal Conservatives, 107 Q. J. Econ. 327 (1992).
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tionally responsible leaders. The assumption of Fishkin's approach
seems to be that the problem with our primary system is that it does
not select leaders who are aware of and willing to deal with public
problems. We suffer from insufficient public debate.
I have some doubts. Given the extensive discussion of public
problems in the media, think tanks and talk shows, I am less certain
that our problems are a lack of cognition as much as a lack of ultimate political accountability of leaders in government, which indirectly frames the nature of debate before and after elections.22 With
our frequent current state of divided and dispersed political institutions, our leaders and the pqhlic know that elected officials do not
need to formulate a program dealing with all the issues, balancing
off the interests of different groups, and forging a communally responsible plan, for which they will ultimately be held responsible.
Symbolic stands and vague promises are successful partly because
politicians and the public know that politicians are unlikely to be
held personally responsible for the past or future performance of
government when they were in Congress or the White House.23 To
the extent this is true, political leaders will be able to talk to the jury
in private, as they talk to the rest of us in public, about waste, fraud
and abuse, obfuscating ultimate choice and responsibility. Fishkin's
plan should improve on the primary system we have now, but we
should be circumspect, as I am sure he would be, about extending it
elsewhere; it certainly will not lead to a deliberative democracy in
this stronger sense. It may simply be a matter of the second best.
Thinking about political reform has ordinarily focused on the
extent to which institutions in Congress, the executive branch and
in political parties frame issues for political choice, stimulate and
organize political participation, and/or implement communal judgments. As entities with an ongoing existence, political institutions
generally are thought to perform these roles by overcoming transaction costs, facilitating systemic debate, minimizing collective-action
problems and promoting collective responsibility. Political parties
in particular may play a special role in overcoming the costs of collective action and responsibility, although we are only vaguely beginning to understand on a formal level how this is accomplished.24
Unfortunately, whatever their other values, primaries seem to
22. See Popkin, The Reasoning Voter (cited in note 13).
23. For the most part, the political accountability of politicians is retrospective, as politicians are held accountable for their past actions. Dialogue in this systemic sense is not
addressed by the Fishkin proposal.
24. For one insightful contribution along these lines, see David Kreps, Corporate Culture And Economic Theory, in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on
Positive Political Economy (Cambridge U. Press, 1990).
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have undermined some of these functions by reducing the significance of political institutions to the political process. They can
force individual politicians into constant direct contact with the
mass public unmediated by organizations traditionally structured to
further the goals outlined above. Moreover, as a practical matter,
while Fishkin's proposal may well help ameliorate the decline of
collective responsibility accompanying these changes, it represents-paradoxically-a somewhat similar approach. Like the
primaries, it minimizes the role of institutions-organizations structured over time to narrow political choice and facilitate mass participation-from the process, both practically and symbolically.
As an incremental change, it should help. The national jury
has the advantage of reducing the impact of the ten-second sound
bites and weekly polls. Taken as a model of government and expanded to other contexts, however, the national jury could be
viewed as undermining those institutions that historically attempted
to fulfill that role-in effect, of representative government itself.
Fishkin's quite thoughtful book is a valuable contribution to thinking about primaries. I would be wary, as I am sure Fishkin would
be as well, about generalizing from his insight.

